Commitment, Learning, and Alliance Performance: A Formal Analysis Using an Agent-Based Network Formation Model by Anjos, Fernando & Reagans, Ray Eugene
Commitment, Learning, and Alliance
Performance: A Formal Analysis
Using an Agent-Based Network
Formation Model∗
Fernando Anjos†
University of Texas at Austin
McCombs School of Business
Ray Reagans‡
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
July 30, 2010
∗The author order is alphabetical. We thank Marcel van Assen, Vincent Buskens, Roberto Fernandez,
Werner Raub, Ezra Zuckerman, and two anonymous referees, for many useful comments and suggestions.
†Finance department; e-mail:fernando.anjos@mccombs.utexas.edu
‡Behavioral and Policy Sciences department; e-mail:rreagans@mit.edu
Abstract
Current theoretical arguments highlight a dilemma faced by actors who either adopt
a weak or strong commitment strategy for managing their alliances and partnerships.
Actors who pursue a weak commitment strategy—i.e. immediately abandon current
partners when a more proﬁtable alternative is presented—are more likely to identify the
most rewarding alliances. On the other hand, actors who enact a strong commitment
approach are more likely to take advantage of whatever opportunities can be found
in existing partnerships. Using agent-based modeling, we show that actors who adopt
a moderate commitment strategy overcome this dilemma and outperform actors who
adopt either weak or strong commitment approaches. We also show that avoiding this
dilemma rests on experiencing a related tradeoﬀ: moderately-committed actors sacriﬁce
short-term performance for the superior knowledge and information that allows them
to eventually do better.
Keywords: commitment, social networks, agent-based modeling.
1 Introduction
Existing theoretical frameworks highlight a dilemma faced by actors who either adopt a weak
or strong commitment strategy for managing their network alliances and partnerships (Uzzi,
1997; Hansen, 1999). Actors who adopt a weak commitment strategy search for new alliance
partners more frequently and as a result are more likely to identify the most rewarding net-
work connections (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn, 1981; Montgomery, 1991; Uzzi, 1997; Hansen,
1999). An example of a weak commitment strategy would be a ﬁrm engaging in a high num-
ber of successive joint ventures in order to exploit new markets that appear attractive, each
time diverting organizational resources from existing to new (joint) projects. On the other
hand, actors who adopt a strong commitment strategy search within existing relationships
and are more likely to take advantage of the opportunities that can be found in current rela-
tionships (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; Zuckerman and
Sgourev, 2006). An example of a strong commitment approach is a ﬁrm that has a reputa-
tion for continuing joint ventures and looking for ways to take advantage of emerging market
opportunities in existing alliances and partnerships. Each strategy can be beneﬁcial but each
one is beset by signiﬁcant challenges as well. In particular, adopting a weak commitment
strategy can come at the expense of acquiring the knowledge and information actors require
to take advantage of any relationship (March, 1991). And adopting a strong commitment
strategy entails signiﬁcant investments in speciﬁc partnerships, investments that can come
at the expense of investments in more rewarding alliances (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).
Indeed, adopting a strong commitment strategy is particularly problematic when shifts in
market demand can change the value of existing alliances and partnerships (March, 1991).
Thus, the commitment dilemma appears to be twofold. An actor who pursues one strategy
must trade oﬀ the beneﬁts associated with the alternative strategy and since each strategy is
risky, there is no guarantee the beneﬁts associated with the chosen strategy will materialize.
One proposed solution to the dilemma is to adopt a mixed strategy,1 and enact a strong
commitment strategy in some network connections and a weak commitment strategy in
other relationships (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). The mixed strategy is often discussed in
terms of weak and strong ties. Actors who pursue a mixed strategy can search for novel
ideas and solutions in their weak ties and then attempt to implement what they ﬁnd in
relationships with close contacts, contacts with whom they have established a more eﬃcient
working relationship. Adopting a mixed strategy can be eﬀective, but it is also limited. The
strategy turns on having the right weak and strong ties. Not all weak ties will yield novel
ideas and solutions and not all strong ties are characterized by eﬃciency. But even if actors
1Here we are not employing the term “mixed strategy” in a game-theoretic sense.
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can develop the right ties, adopting a mixed strategy is more likely to be eﬀective when
knowledge and expertise is homogeneous across contacts, such that ideas discovered in weak
ties can be developed in strong ties. When knowledge and expertise are heterogeneous across
contacts, it will be more diﬃcult for an actor to enact a mixed strategy.
Indeed, in a number of market contexts, network connections are valuable because in
addition to being information sources, they provide actors with an opportunity to improve
their performance by combining complementary assets. Inter-ﬁrm strategic alliances are an
example. Firms with a core competence in one domain form alliances with ﬁrms possessing
complementary assets. The nature of the complementary relationship between the two ﬁrms
could vary from a marketing agreement to research and development. Strategic alliances
provide actors with an opportunity to create value, but since actors create value by combining
assets that are relatively ﬁxed at a single point in time, it appears that actors still face the
commitment dilemma. Actors can either search for the most rewarding alliances or they can
search for opportunities within existing partnerships.
We develop a solution to the commitment dilemma in a market where actors are endowed
with a core competence and attempt to improve their performance by building complemen-
tary network connections. In developing our argument, we focus on the implications of
adopting a particular commitment strategy and set aside how actors develop a strategy.
Prior research has focused on actors who either adopt a weak or strong commitment strat-
egy. Actors who adopt a moderate commitment strategy have, at least implicitly, been
ignored.2 This neglect is unfortunate, because when actors can learn the value of a part-
nership through their own experiences and from the experiences of their contacts, actors
who exhibit a moderate level of commitment have a learning advantage. In particular, when
network connections are conduits for information diﬀusion, actors who commit to a speciﬁc
set of partnerships sacriﬁce knowledge breadth for greater depth, while actors who avoid
commitment trade knowledge depth for greater breadth. Actors who exhibit a moderate
level of commitment will be better informed about a wider array of partnerships. Moreover,
actors who exhibit a moderate level of commitment can also avoid risks that characterize the
weak and strong commitment approaches. Strong commitment actors run the risk of being
excluded from a relationship, when fundamentals in a market shift and the alliance part-
ner decides their partnership is no longer valuable. Weak commitment actors run the risk
of attempting to develop an alliance with a partner who does not realize the value of their
partnership. Actors who exhibit a moderate level of commitment are less likely to experience
2Our moderate commitment strategy is diﬀerent than a mixed strategy in the standard game-theoretic
sense. In game theory, a mixed strategy (in equilibrium) implies that agents are indiﬀerent between the pure
strategies they are mixing over. In our setting, a moderately-committed actor is not indiﬀerent between weak
or strong commitment; but rather the actor is playing a distinct strategy which is superior in the long-run.
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these kinds of “coordination failures” and since network connections are conduits for infor-
mation diﬀusion, moderate commitment actors also have more opportunities to accumulate
knowledge and information, further enhancing their learning advantage.
The preceding discussion suggests that adopting a moderate commitment strategy sets in
motion dynamics that increase the likelihood that an actor will identify and exploit proﬁtable
alliances, thereby avoiding the tradeoﬀ either a weak or strong commitment strategy can in-
troduce. The preceding discussion also suggests that avoiding the commitment tradeoﬀ rests
on experiencing a related sacriﬁce in the near term. Actors who adopt a moderate commit-
ment strategy sacriﬁce short-term gains in performance in order to accumulate knowledge
and information that allows them to do better in the long run.
We illustrate these dynamics with an agent-based model. The agents in our model are
endowed with a core competence and attempt to improve their performance by building
complementary partnerships. Consistent with the market context discussed above, we as-
sume the value of a network partnership is unknown initially and that actors learn the value
of partnerships from their direct investments and the investments of their contacts. We
also assume the market is characterized by shifts in demand that can change the value of
a partnership. Shifts in demand are diﬃcult to forecast but when demand is high (low)
the value of a particular alliance is also high (low). Our simulation results show that ac-
tors who enact a moderate commitment strategy sacriﬁce short-term performance to learn
what diﬀerent partnerships are worth, but do better in the long run because the information
they accumulate early on allows them to identify and eventually gain access to rewarding
partnerships.
2 Model
We develop our model in three distinct steps.3 First, we develop a model of network forma-
tion. Next we turn our attention to the value or productivities of alliances. We then deﬁne
how the network connections that develop aﬀect the information environment and therefore
agents’ ability to learn what diﬀerent partnerships are worth. The model we develop is ﬂex-
ible and can be utilized in a number of contexts. We are interested in the implications of
commitment in the market context described above. Therefore, we deﬁne a benchmark case
that captures essential features of that context and use the benchmark in our simulation
analysis.
3All technical details (including proofs) that are not necessary to understand the main intuitions are
contained in a technical appendix, available online.
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2.1 Network formation
We model a dynamic network society comprising 푁 actors/agents, each possessing one com-
petence.4 There are 푀 ≤ 푁 distinct competences; and 푁/푀 agents per competence.5
Agents can combine their competences bilaterally, which yields an uncertain payoﬀ in the
next period. The performance equation for agent 푖 at time 푡 is given by the following ex-
pression:
푄푖,푡 =
푁∑
푗=1
퐵푖푗,푡 퐿푖푗,푡, (1)
where 퐵푖푗,푡 is the productivity factor when 푖 and 푗 combine what they know at time 푡 and
퐿푖푗,푡 ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a link between agents 푖 and 푗 exists at time 푡. We shall refer
to the full matrix of links at time 푡 as 퐿푡. It is assumed that 퐵푖푗,푡 = 퐵푗푖,푡 and 퐵푖푗,푡 = 0 if 푖 and
푗 belong to the same competence cohort. One way to interpret equation (1) is to consider
that the value of a successful alliance is a function of some exogenous demand (퐵푖푗,푡) for
whatever product or service an alliance will deliver. But this product or service will only be
delivered if agents are able to create an alliance (i.e. when 퐿푖푗,푡 = 1).
The probability that a network connection between agents 푖 and 푗 exists at time 푡 + 1
is a function of the attention that each actor devotes at 푡 to the relationship. Later we
will let the amount of attention actors devote to each other vary with how productive they
believe their relationship will be. Formally we assume that the probability of a relationship
developing between two actors is given by the following equation:
Prob {퐿푖푗,푡+1 = 1} = 퐹 (푎푖푗,푡, 푎푗푖,푡) := √푎푖푗,푡 푎푗푖,푡, (2)
where 푎푖푗 ∈ [0, 1] stands for the attention that agent 푖 devotes to the link with agent 푗.6 This
mechanism of building ties follows Anjos (2008) closely and is in the spirit of Gould (2002)
and also game-theoretic literature on network formation, e.g. Jackson and Wolinski (1996)
or Bala and Goyal (2000). This mechanism has two key features: (i) a relationship is the
product of joint eﬀort; and (ii) associations are voluntary, in the sense that any agent can
unilaterally prevent a tie (by setting 푎푖푗 = 0).
Each agent has a ﬁxed amount of time to invest in network connections, which we set to 1
4By competence we mean proﬁciency in some technical ﬁeld, e.g. a profession for individuals or an
industry (or geographical market) for ﬁrms.
5We could let our agents have more than one competence and/or vary in terms of their competence levels.
Doing so, however, would complicate our analysis but would not change our substantive conclusions.
6We could have speciﬁed a more general functional form, but this one is simple, captures the essential
features we want to model regarding link formation, and is also concave in each of its arguments. The latter
property is convenient once we solve each agent’s maximization problem (see footnote 9).
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in order to keep the probabilities of link formation in the unit interval. Agents act interestedly
and from time to time they revise their partnership decisions. At any time 푡 agent 푖 revises
each network partnership with probability 훾푖. Agents with lower 훾 are interpreted as more
committed to their partnerships.7 A detailed discussion of the role played by commitment
is postponed until section 2.4. Conditional on a revision taking place, the agent maximizes
total expected payoﬀ for the next period, taking others’ actions as given. The only proﬁtable
links for 푖 are the ones with agents outside her competence cohort; denote this set by 풩˜ (푖).
In formal terms, agent 푖 thus solves the following constrained maximization problem at time
푡:
max
{푎푖푗,푡}푗∈풩˜ (푖)
∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
피 [퐵푖푗,푡+1∣Ω푖,푡]
√
푎푖푗,푡푎ˆ푗푖,푡 (3)
s.t.∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
푎푖푗,푡 ≤ 1 (휆푖,푡) (4)
푎푖푗,푡 ≥ 0 (휃푖푗,푡) (5)
The variable 푎ˆ푗푖,푡 denotes the estimate/belief that agent 푖 has with respect to the action of 푗.
We shall restrict ourselves to the case where 푎ˆ푗푖,푡 corresponds to last period’s choice 푎푗푖,푡−1,
which we assume is observable at 푡 by 푖;8 this belief is “rational” in our simulation setting
since indeed there will be a positive correlation between previous attention and present
attention. Agent 푖’s information set at date 푡 is Ω푖,푡; later on we will detail the information
environment. 휆 and 휃 are Lagrange multipliers.
The Lagrangian associated with the agent’s maximization problem is given by
ℒ푖,푡 =
∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
퐵ˆ푖푗,푡
√
푎푖푗,푡푎ˆ푗푖,푡 − 휆푖,푡
(∑
푗 ∕=푖
푎푖푗,푡 − 1
)
+
∑
푗 ∕=푖
휃푖푗,푡푎푖푗,푡,
where 퐵ˆ푖푗,푡 := 피 [퐵푖푗,푡+1∣Ω푖,푡]. The ﬁrst-order conditions (one for each 푗 ∈ 풩˜ (푖)) identify all
푎푖푗:
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퐵ˆ푖푗
2
√
푎ˆ푗푖
푎푖푗
− 휆푖 + 휃푖푗 = 0, (6)
where we omitted time subscripts to avoid notational complexity. It is straightforward to
7We note that our notion of commitment is unilateral, in the sense deﬁned in Buskens and Royakkers
(2002).
8This corresponds to “best-response dynamics”, which is one way to converge to a stable Nash equilibrium.
9Second-order conditions always obtain, given the concavity implied by equation (2).
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show that the attention constraint (4) is binding, which implies 휆푖 > 0. In addition, as
long as the 퐵ˆ terms are positive, which we assume, the optimal decision rules are interior
(this will become apparent below), i.e. all 휃 multipliers are zero. Manipulating equation (6),
best-response functions may be written as
푎푖푗 =
퐵ˆ2푖푗 푎ˆ푗푖
4휆2푖
. (7)
With complementary link production, as is the case with our functional form for 퐹 (.) from
equation (2), the level of attention that the focal actor dispenses to some other actor is a
function of the belief about the other actor’s attention. It is also clear from equation (7)
that the higher the expected payoﬀ of combining competences 퐵ˆ푖푗, the higher the amount
of attention devoted to the link with 푗. The Lagrange multiplier 휆푖 captures the shadow
cost of the constraint on the summation of 푎푖푗, i.e. the shadow cost of time. Intuitively this
corresponds to the value of 푖’s partnership alternatives beyond 푗, so it can be viewed as the
value of the “best outside option”. The higher this cost is for 푖, the lower the time devoted
to the link with 푗.
Summing both sides of equation (7), and making use of constraint (4) in equality, we
obtain an expression for 휆2푖 :
1 =
∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
푎푖푗 =
∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
퐵ˆ2푖푗 푎ˆ푗푖
4휆2푖
⇔
휆2푖 =
∑
푗∈풩˜ (푖)
퐵ˆ2푖푗 푎ˆ푗푖
4
(8)
Combining (7) and (8) we have an expression for best-response attention as a function of
productivity forecasts and beliefs about others’ actions:
푎푖푗 =
퐵ˆ2푖푗 푎ˆ푗푖∑
푘∈풩˜ (푖) 퐵ˆ
2
푖푘푎ˆ푘푖
(9)
Equation (9) shows how agents allocate their attention to potential contacts as a function
of how productive they believe diﬀerent partnerships are and how much attention they
believe potential partners will allocate to them. With this framework, we are assuming
agents are myopic and are only interested in next period’s payoﬀs. Thus our agents are
either characterized by bounded rationality or consider time periods to be long enough such
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that future outcomes are discounted at a high rate.10 We are also assuming that actors are
only concerned with network dynamics in their immediate network neighborhood.
2.2 Alliance productivities
Our current objective is to deﬁne our alliance productivities. For the purpose of illustration,
we assume each alliance will deliver a product or service and the market demand for the
product or service ﬂuctuates and is diﬃcult to forecast. Demand takes on one of two values
and when demand is high (low), the value of an alliance is also high (low). The unobserved
mean payoﬀ 퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡 associated with a speciﬁc demand follows a two-state Markov chain.
11
Thus, any 퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡 may take on only one of two values: 퐵ℎ = (1 + 휎퐵) (high level of pro-
ductivity, or “good times”) or 퐵푙 = (1−휎퐵) (low level of productivity, or “bad times”). The
parameter 휎퐵 ∈ [0, 1) determines how volatile 퐵¯ is. Parameter 휙 governs the likelihood of
change in market demand (i.e., from good to bad times and vice-versa). The closer 휙 is to 1,
the more persistent alliance productivities are. Given a speciﬁc market condition (i.e., high
or low demand), agents learn about the value of a partnership either through their direct
experiences or through the experiences of the alliance partners. The signal agents receive
about the value of an alliance however is noisy, and it comes in the form of realized perfor-
mance 퐵푖푗,푡. Realized performance is modeled as a function of the underlying persistent level
of demand we speciﬁed above (i.e., 퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡), plus white noise from normally-distributed
shocks 휖푖푗,푡, with mean zero and volatility 휎휖. More speciﬁcally, for any {푖, 푗} that belong to
diﬀerent competence cohorts we have
퐵푖푗,푡 = 퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡 + 휖푖푗,푡. (10)
Our treatment of the alliance productivities has two important implications: (i) since
actors only receive noisy signals about the current value of a partnership either from their
own investments or the investments of their contacts, the accuracy of their beliefs about this
mean is a function of experience; and (ii) if changes in 퐵¯ are big enough (i.e. if 휎퐵 is high
enough), then actors who either do not learn (i.e. who do not know how much alliances are
worth) or do not adapt (i.e. do not implement new partnerships) will perform very poorly.
10An additional interpretation is that the future is very risky, and thus agents discount expected values
at high rates.
11For an overview of this type of process see Hamilton (2008).
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2.3 Information environment
We now turn our attention to how actors receive information and update their beliefs about
how valuable diﬀerent partnerships are. We assume agents update their beliefs according
to Bayes’ rule. The technical details associated with the belief dynamics are detailed in
the technical appendix. With respect to how actors receive information, we assume that an
agent 푖 hears the realized performance of some linked pair (푗, 푘) through 푗 according to the
following probability:
Prob {퐵푗푘,푡 is observed by 푖 through 푗} = 퐺 (푖, 푗, 퐿푡) := 1
1 + 훼퐷푖푗,푡
, (11)
where the distance function 퐷푖푗,푡 depends also on indirect links and is described in the
appendix. Parameter 훼 ≥ 0 determines how important distance is for observing other
agents’ realized performances; 훼 governs the rate at which information diﬀuses across network
connections. If 훼 = 0 agents hear about all realized performances. Also, agents hear about
their own realized performance with probability 1, for any 훼, since we deﬁne self distance
to be zero. If for example 훼 = 1 and 푖 shares a direct connection with 푗 (but no indirect
connections), then according to our distance function we have 퐷푖푗 = 1, and so the probability
of 푖 hearing about 푗’s experiences is 0.5. If 푖 and 푗 additionally shared an indirect tie, then
this probability would jump to 0.6 (see appendix for details). Finally, note that as 훼 gets
larger you only learn from your own experiences.
2.4 Commitment
We have developed a model where agents enter into alliances with uncertain performance
implications. Our agents learn what the alliances are worth directly through their own
investments and potentially indirectly through the investments of other agents. In this
section we discuss the role we expect for commitment—in particular moderate commitment—
to play in terms of agents’ performance. Commitment is the willingness to not always
revise one’s partnerships, even when more rewarding interactions are available; in our model
this is gaged by an actor-speciﬁc parameter 훾푖, that measures the likelihood of revision (so
e.g. when 훾푖 = 1, this means 푖 is fully non-committed). To appreciate the implications of
alternative commitment strategies, it is also useful to recall how our agents allocate attention
to partnerships (equation (9)):
푎푖푗 =
퐵ˆ2푖푗 푎ˆ푗푖∑
푘∈풩˜ (푖) 퐵ˆ
2
푖푘푎ˆ푘푖
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Our agents allocate attention to partnerships they believe are rewarding. If actors have
divergent beliefs (i.e., disagree about the value of a partnership), an alliance is less likely to
materialize. For example, if one of the partners (푖 or 푗) does not believe their partnership will
yield a positive performance outcome, (i.e., 퐵 equals 0), their link (퐿푖푗) is zero, independently
of the other partner’s optimism. To appreciate why this is so, it may be useful to recall our
link production function (equation (2)):
Prob {퐿푖푗,푡+1 = 1} = 퐹 (푎푖푗,푡, 푎푗푖,푡) := √푎푖푗,푡 푎푗푖,푡
Disagreement about the value of a partnership increases the likelihood that actors will expe-
rience a coordination failure and waste network time at time 푡. The negative disagreement
eﬀect is only realized if agents act on their beliefs regarding the expected value of a partner-
ship at a speciﬁc point in time, so exhibiting some commitment should reduce the likelihood
that an agent will experience a coordination failure. Coordination failures are also more
likely if an agent is unable to forecast how much attention a potential partner will allocate
at time 푡 (푎ˆ푗푖,푡). Actors who adopt a weak commitment strategy are more diﬃcult to correctly
forecast because they update their partnerships more frequently. Actors who adopt a strong
commitment strategy are easiest to forecast and actors who adopt a moderate commitment
strategy are easier to forecast than actors who adopt a weak commitment strategy. So far
we have focused on the coordination costs of weak commitment. Agents who exhibit strong
commitment can experience coordination failures as well. Strong commitment actors are
easier to forecast but they do not update their partnerships when market demand changes
and the value of the partnership changes as well. Agents who exhibit strong commitment
are more likely to experience a coordination failure when a current partner decides their
partnership is no longer worthwhile.
Overall, we expect for agents who adopt a moderate commitment (MC) strategy to
experience fewer coordination failures. Being able to avoid coordination failures improves
performance directly but it can also improve performance indirectly. Agents learn what
alliances are worth either through direct experiences (which only happen if alliances mate-
rialize) or through the experiences of others (which an agent is more likely to hear about as
its number of alliance partners increases). Thus MC agents should have a higher quantity of
information because they will be in a position to hear what more alliances are worth. MC
actors should also have a higher quality of information. Strong commitment (SC) actors
will know a great deal more about speciﬁc alliances (depth), while WC actors will know
more about the range of alternatives (breadth). MC actors combine depth and breadth.
The learning advantage a moderate commitment strategy introduces should allow an agent
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to perform better over the long-run because agents who adopt such an approach are more
likely to identify the more proﬁtable alliances. Being informed is not enough. In order to do
well, agents must be willing to act on their information, which moderate commitment actors
are also willing to do.
We can now summarize the beneﬁts adopting a moderate commitment strategy will
introduce. We expect for actors who adopt a moderate commitment strategy to experience
fewer coordination failures and to have a learning advantage. When combined with the
willingness to act, the corollary is that MC actors will end up “exploiting” the right alliances
in the long run. MC actors are in a better position to ﬁgure out which alliances are most
proﬁtable and are willing to act on their information. Naturally these predictions apply under
the appropriate scope conditions, which we discuss next when motivating our calibration.
2.5 Benchmark calibration
Our fully-speciﬁed model has a high number of parameters and variables. We deﬁne the
benchmark case as one where we restrict our attention to a model that corresponds to the
market conditions described in the introduction and where we only analyze variations in 훾,
the level of commitment or commitment strategy. Also, given the large number of parameters
and variables, we believe that at this point it is useful to provide a summary descriptive table
(table 1).
[Table 1 about here.]
The assumptions (and respective rationale) for the benchmark model are given below.
The arguments outlined also summarize what we view as the main scope conditions for
commitment to have the outcomes proposed above.
1. 푁 = 36 and 푀 = 6, i.e. there are 6 distinct competence cohorts and 6 agents per
cohort; while this may be still low-dimensional, it is complex enough to yield interesting
results and remains computationally tractable.
2. 훼 = 1, which allows for agents to learn from their contacts’ investments and experi-
ences. In section 3.1.2, we let 훼 vary to see how variation in 훼 aﬀects the value of
diﬀerent commitment strategies.
3. 휙 = 0.95, i.e. hidden mean payoﬀs are quite persistent (the probability that a “good
combination” becomes bad in the next period is simply 5%, and vice-versa). If hidden
mean payoﬀs are not signiﬁcantly persistent then the model becomes uninteresting,
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in the sense that it is never possible to forecast future payoﬀs with a relatively high
accuracy, even if you observe many realized performances.12 In other words, there
would be no opportunity to learn. Also, if this lack of persistence is known by the
actors, which is implied in our Bayesian approach for beliefs’ dynamics, then there will
be no disagreement, but the lack of disagreement is predicated on pluralistic ignorance.
4. 휎퐵 = 0.9, which means that the variance in the hidden payoﬀ is high (note that the
maximum is 1). The magnitude of this parameter determines two important dimen-
sions: (i) the penalty of not responding to changes in the environment increases with
휎퐵; and (ii) the potential for coordination failure also increases with 휎퐵. Regarding the
latter aspect, note that according to equation (9) an agent discriminates amongst her
potential partners as a function of the dispersion in beliefs regarding the advantages
of each partnership. If 휎퐵 is low, then there is a tendency to pay the same attention
to every other actor, which limits the level of coordination failure.
5. 휎휖 = 0.1, i.e. white noise is of a moderate size compared to volatility in hidden payoﬀs,
which generates a “reasonable” informational learning curve. For very low 휎휖 agents
learn very quickly and homogeneously about hidden means after observing just a few
realized performances (learning is too easy). For high 휎휖 agents do not infer much from
observed experiences and tend to always assign a 50% chance to combination payoﬀs
being high or low (learning is too hard), which again generates pluralistic ignorance.
Intermediate levels of 휎휖 provide agents with opportunities to learn what alliances are
worth.
3 Results
3.1 Simulation analysis
3.1.1 Alternative commitment strategies and long-run performance
Table 2 illustrates performance outcomes in a society populated by three distinct commit-
ment types (henceforth “mixed society”). Actors adopt one of three commitment strategies:
(1) strong commitment (SC), with 훾 = 0.05; (2) moderate commitment (MC), with 훾 = 0.5;
and (3) weak commitment (WC), with 훾 = 1. For each competence cohort, 1/3 of the agents
is SC, 1/3 is MC, and 1/3 is WC. Simulation results to be presented do not depend on
12For our two-state Markov chain, the average number of periods until transition is given by 1/(1 − 휙),
so in our case hidden means are unchanged for an average of 20 periods (we simulate the model for 50,000
periods, which allows for many transitions).
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the composition of our society and our ﬁndings are also robust to how we deﬁne moderate
commitment (e.g. 0.5 versus 0.7). A more detailed discussion of these issues can be found
in section A.4 of the technical appendix.
[Table 2 about here.]
The results in table 2 for WC and SC actors are consistent with prior theorizing. Actors
who adopt a weak commitment strategy are involved in more proﬁtable alliances but also
tend to know the least. Actors who adopt a strong commitment strategy know more than
actors who pursue a weak commitment strategy but actors who make strong commitments
are involved in less proﬁtable alliances. Actors who adopt a moderate commitment strategy
have average rewards in between these two extremes. However, actors who exhibit a moderate
level of commitment are also less likely to experience coordination failures and accumulate
more knowledge. Being more knowledgeable and avoiding coordination failures allows actors
who adopt a moderate commitment strategy to be involved in a larger number of rewarding
alliances, which improves their overall performance level. Overall, the results in table 2
illustrate the risks and rewards associated with adopting either a weak or strong commitment
strategy. The results also illustrate the advantages that allow actors who exhibit a moderate
level of commitment (i.e., learning and avoiding coordination failures) to do better in the
long run.
The results in table 2 are informative but they also obscure important short-run dynamics.
In particular, the results obscure dynamics that occur as market demand shifts. Changes
in market demand are associated with a need to learn and to adapt to a new environment.
The members of a particular competence cohort experience a shift in their environment each
time the value of one of their alliances changes.13 After each shift in demand, we measure
the amount of time actors face the same market environment (i.e., the value of their alliances
remains constant). Shifts in demand happen about every 20 rounds in our simulation and so
our time variable varies from zero to twenty. For each time interval, we calculate the mean
payoﬀ for each realized alliance, the average overall level of performance, the proportion of
times an actor experiences coordination failure, and the average amount of knowledge and
information an actor has accumulated up until the time interval.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
13In the model, this means a change associated with actor 푖’s competence value, measured by the average
퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡, across 푚(푗).
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The results are illustrated in table 3 and ﬁgure 1. The results are consistent with the
long-term performance outcomes (ﬁgure 1a; table 3 – ﬁrst regression). Actors who adopt
a moderate commitment strategy are involved in alliances that lie in between the alliances
for weak and strong commitment actors (ﬁgure 1b; table 3 – second regression). They are
less likely to experience coordination failures (ﬁgure 1c; table 3 – third regression) and know
more (ﬁgure 1d; table 3 – fourth regression). But although MC actors know more, WC
actors are involved in more proﬁtable alliances (ﬁgure 1b; table 3 – second regression). This
diﬀerence illustrates an important element of our argument. Actors who adopt a moderate
commitment strategy update their partnerships more slowly. Slow updating makes them
more predictable and provides them with an opportunity to learn what alliances are worth.
The knowledge MC types are accumulating, however, is coming at the expense of short-term
improvements in performance.
An alternative way of measuring the short-run cost of moderate commitment is to com-
pare performance in periods where MC actors revise their decisions to periods where they do
not. In our simulation, the average MC actor performance conditional on a revision taking
place is 1.25, which compares to 1.21 without revision.14 This analysis illustrates the tension
faced by MC actors, by making clear that they are well “aware” that they would do better
in the short-run by revising, i.e. by not committing.
3.1.2 Information diﬀusion
The results above indicate that MC actors do well in part because they have a learning
advantage. 훼 governs the rate at which information diﬀuses across network connections and
so variation in 훼 should aﬀect how much MC beneﬁt from updating their alliances more
slowly. Therefore, it is informative to compare our outcomes at diﬀerent levels of 훼.
[Table 4 about here.]
The results are in table 4. As we expected, the learning advantage associated with
adopting a moderate commitment strategy varies with 훼. When 훼 is equal to zero, all
knowledge is common knowledge. As 훼 increases, knowledge and information becomes more
sticky and remains localized in network neighborhoods. When 훼 equals 999,999 actors only
beneﬁt from their own experiences. The point is that as 훼 increases, the learning advantage
MC types enjoy begins to disappear. The ranking of the strategies with respect to overall
performance changes very little because although changes in 훼 aﬀects MC types’ learning
advantage, they still have an edge because they are more predictable. And as a result
14Also note that whether an agent revises or not is an exogenous random variable.
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actors who adopt a moderate commitment strategy are less likely to experience coordination
failures, which improves their overall level of performance.
The results in table 4 illustrate the importance of avoiding coordination failures. Coordi-
nation failures are especially problematic for actors who adopt a weak commitment strategy.
Indeed, the coordination failures associated with a weak commitment strategy are actually
understated in table 4. Actors who exhibit some commitment (and especially actors who
exhibit a moderate level of commitment) create spillovers that actors who adopt a weak
commitment strategy are able to enjoy.15 If the society only contains actors who adopt
a weak commitment strategy, coordination failure becomes an equilibrium. We prove this
result analytically in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, using simpliﬁed versions of the model.
3.2 Coordination failure in WC societies
3.2.1 Long-run performance of WC society
The network society in ﬁgure 2 is composed of actors who revise their partnership decisions
every period, i.e. weak-commitment actors. When a network society is composed of WC
actors only, the initial average performance is positive. However, as time passes, the average
performance level declines and approaches zero.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In early rounds, WC actors materialize some partnerships, mainly due to our choice of a
starting point where there is an equal distribution of attention across all potential partners.
As actors revise their decisions, and given the learning disadvantage of WC actors, disagree-
ments about the value of interactions generate coordination failures. These coordination
failures are ampliﬁed by the diﬃculty in forecasting WC actors’ behavior, since these actors
are constantly changing their decisions (recall equation (9)). Eventually the system becomes
trapped in a state where very few alliances materialize and thus average performance is close
to zero.
In the following sections we show with more formalism how the strong form of coordina-
tion failure between WC actors comes about, using simpliﬁed versions of the model, which
yield analytical tractability.
15We construct a measure of in-group focus, which for WC actors is the average fraction of time devoted
to other WC actors. This measure correlates very negatively with the performance of WC actors (estimate
of −0.76).
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3.2.2 Disagreement about the expected value of an interaction
One simpliﬁcation that generates tractability is symmetric disagreement. Consider any net-
work society where each agent 푖 has only two types of potential partners: one group where
agent 푖 has an expectation of 퐵푙 (low payoﬀ) regarding the combination payoﬀ, the other
where agent 푖 has an expectation of 퐵ℎ (high payoﬀ).
We will further assume that although agents have heterogeneous beliefs regarding the
combinations, in reality all combinations yield the same payoﬀ 퐵. Moreover, actors have
dogmatic priors (unlike what we assumed in the simulation section), so they never update
their beliefs regarding combination payoﬀs. This last assumption is strong, but it is consistent
with our simulation results that show that indeed disagreement emerges when WC actors
interact. We gage the level of disagreement in beliefs by a parameter 푥 ≥ 0, that determines
the gap between 퐵푙 and 퐵ℎ:
퐵ℎ = 퐵 (1 + 푥) (12)
퐵푙 =
퐵
(1 + 푥)
(13)
When agents correctly forecast others’ actions, then society attains a Nash equilibrium,
i.e. the dynamic system remains in the same state for all periods 푡. In this stylized set-
ting, where agents are symmetric, it is natural to compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 contains the results.
Proposition 1 The dynamic network society has a Nash equilibrium with the following prop-
erties:
1. Average degree 퐿¯ is
퐿¯ =
1 + 푥
1 + 푥+ 푥2/2
≤ 1. (14)
2. Average performance 푄¯ is
푄¯ = 퐵 퐿¯ = 퐵
(
1 + 푥
1 + 푥+ 푥2/2
)
. (15)
It follows that both equilibrium degree and performance are monotonically decreasing in dis-
agreement 푥.
The point of the analysis above is that performance in this setting depends as much on
fundamentals (the magnitude 퐵) as on the level of disagreement 푥. Such coordination failures
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are overcome by commitment: Consider for example that everyone was able to commit to
homogeneous attention across actors, despite diﬀerences in opinion. Then the level of average
degree would increase to 1, i.e. it would be as if agents did not disagree.
There is an alternative way of showing the role played by disagreement in WC societies,
namely by running our simulation under full public information (훼 = 0). With full public
information there is no scope for disagreement. Table 5 shows the results, comparing these
with the case depicted in ﬁgure 2 (훼 = 1).
[Table 5 about here.]
For zero 훼 coordination failure diminishes drastically, from 96% to 38%. This is a society
that reacts quickly and eﬃciently to changes in the environment, producing a relatively high
level of performance, 1.34. By shutting down the learning disadvantage of WC actors which
produces disagreement, the beneﬁts of commitment are naturally reduced (recall that the
average performance of MC actors in our mixed society is 1.23).
3.2.3 Lack of synchronism
An important source of uncertainty in our model is the necessity to forecast others’ actions.
This dimension is ignored in our Nash equilibrium analysis from section 3.2.2, since players
are implicitly assumed to forecast others’ actions correctly.16 In reality, agents interacting in
social and economic settings need to adopt heuristics that allow them to forecast how others
will behave. A common heuristic in evolutionary game theory is to use previous actions as
estimates of future actions (best-response dynamics), and this is the heuristic we employ in
the simulation analysis. In particular, this heuristic seems sensible in settings where all actors
anticipate partnership payoﬀs to be somewhat persistent, as in our case.17 However, we will
show next that this heuristic can generate cycling behavior that is detrimental to coordination
in WC societies (proposition 2). And more importantly, in WC societies this cycling behavior
strongly ampliﬁes the negative eﬀects of disagreement, even when disagreement is transient
(proposition 3).
Consider a simple artiﬁcial society, with 푁 = 3 actors, each having a unique competence
(so 푀 = 3). Further assume that there is no heterogeneity in beliefs regarding competence
combinations and in particular all combinations yield the same certain payoﬀ 퐵. The fol-
lowing proposition shows that in this stylized setting it is possible that agents are never able
to materialize links.
16In many instances, Nash equilibria are not stable, i.e. they only correspond to ﬁxed points of the system
if the system starts at the equilibrium. This lack of stability is present in our dynamic model, as propositions
2 and 3 illustrate.
17So on average ego would be motivated to keep his current partners.
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Proposition 2 Consider the following initial beliefs for others’ actions:
푎ˆ21,0 = 푎ˆ32,0 = 푎ˆ13,0 = 1 (16)
푎ˆ31,0 = 푎ˆ12,0 = 푎ˆ23,0 = 0 (17)
Then if all agents display no commitment, the evolution of players’ decisions and beliefs is
such that no link is ever materialized.
The particular form of coordination failure described above results from the emergence
of cycling behavior in the dynamic system. Agents act on their erroneous beliefs about
others’ actions in a way that such errors carry over to the subsequent period (see proof
for details). This form of coordination failure can be oﬀset eﬀectively by commitment.
Committed agents will sometimes not change their actions from one period to the next.
This guarantees that forecasts of other actors regarding committed actors—according to
the heuristic actors employ to forecast others’ actions—will indeed correspond to the truth
and this will allow for links to materialize. One could view committed actors as being
sophisticated about the behavioral traits of others: It is as if they “understand” that given
others’ heuristics, then it may make sense to behave in a way that makes the heuristic
work, in order to achieve eﬀective link formation. In the process this naturally generates
a positive externality for weakly committed actors, who are rescued from the asynchronous
traps described above.
Proposition 3 below shows how disagreement with respect to fundamentals gets embedded
in the asynchronism problem.
Proposition 3 Consider the same 3-actor artiﬁcial society from proposition 2, but now all
actors have unbiased beliefs regarding others’ actions at time 푡 = 0 and there is initial sym-
metric disagreement 푥 as in section 3.2.2. Assume further that this disagreement disappears
after time 푡 = 0. Then if all agents display no commitment, the probability that a link forms
between any pair of actors is constant across time and given by
퐹 =
(1 + 푥)2
1 + (1 + 푥)4
. (18)
It follows that (i) average degree—and consequently average performance—decreases with
initial disagreement; and (ii) average degree and performance can become arbitrarily close to
zero, for large enough initial disagreement 푥.
The proposition shows that initial disagreement leads to a coordination failure that is
an absorbing state of the dynamic system. This leads to the natural conjecture that even if
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there is a very small chance of high disagreement in more realistic settings, this can still be
very important. Once a high level of disagreement is realized, then it may trap the system
(or the average actor) in a very poor state for many remaining periods.
The propositions in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 illustrate the macro implications of a micro
behavioral trait (commitment). The self-correcting nature of commitment rescues social
actors from the strong forms of coordination failure that are possible to come about when
agents update their decisions too frequently. Coordination failure is particularly problematic
in our setting, because not only it hinders performance directly, but also it limits learning
opportunities that lead to eﬃcient partner matching.18
4 Discussion and conclusion
We have shown that when network connections are information sources and provide actors
with an opportunity to improve their performance by combining complementary assets, ac-
tors who adopted a moderate commitment strategy outperformed actors who either adopted
a weak or strong commitment approach to managing their network connections. Actors who
adopted a moderate commitment strategy were better informed about a larger array of po-
tential partnerships. Actors who adopted a weak commitment strategy ended up sacriﬁcing
knowledge breadth for depth, while actors who adopted a strong commitment strategy traded
depth for breadth. We also demonstrated that actors who adopted a moderate commitment
strategy were able to avoid the “coordination failures” that characterized the weak and strong
commitment approaches. And since network connections were conduits for information diﬀu-
sion, actors who adopted a moderate commitment strategy had more opportunities to learn,
further enhancing their learning advantage. And it is worth noting that the learning beneﬁts
that underlie the moderate commitment strategy were understated in our model. Our actors
only learned what diﬀerent partnerships were worth. If we allowed the returns to engaging
in an alliance to increase with experience (i.e., an experience curve), actors who adopted a
moderate commitment strategy would have been even more advantaged. Overall, we have
shown that adopting a moderate commitment strategy sets in motion a number of dynamics
that allowed actors to avoid the tradeoﬀ that enacting either a weak or strong commitment
strategy would introduce. We have also shown, however, that avoiding this tradeoﬀ rested
on experiencing a similar sacriﬁce. Actors who adopted a moderate commitment strategy
18The results from sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 suggest that starting conditions are important. However, we
hasten to add that starting conditions matter little in our simulations. Since our societies contain actors
who can learn and we provide these actors with the opportunity to do so, starting conditions only matter
during the initial rounds of the simulation.
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sacriﬁced current performance for the knowledge and information that allowed them to do
better in the long run.
We believe our framework advances our understanding of how commitment aﬀects net-
work dynamics. We also believe it is important to emphasize the scope conditions of our
argument. We have focused on a context where network connections provide actors with
an opportunity to combine complementary assets. Strategic alliances are the example we
used to illustrate our argument but there are other examples, such as partnerships between
academics trained in diﬀerent disciplines, or between ﬁrm members in diﬀerent organiza-
tional units. The network connections in our model are information sources (i.e., “pipes”)
but do not have any symbolic value (i.e., “prisms”) (Podolny, 2001). This means that the
commitment strategy an actor pursues does not have any implications for its social status
or identity. The relationships actors develop can have implications for their social identities
and the identities that develop can constrain the set of strategies that are deemed appropri-
ate in the future (Podolny, 2008; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008). When relationships have
symbolic value, the commitment dilemma we discussed only deepens because it would be
more diﬃcult for actors who adopt a weak or strong commitment strategy to reverse course.
Indeed, in such a context, pursuing a moderate commitment strategy could be untenable if
it makes it diﬃcult for an actor to develop a coherent social identity.
Thus, our proposed solution only applies when networks are “pipes” and not “prisms”.
But even if networks do not have any symbolic value, the moderate commitment strategy
will only be worthwhile if actors have an incentive and opportunity to learn. For example,
if we remove the incentive and opportunity to learn from our model and let the productiv-
ities of our alliances vary with shifts in market demand, frequent shifts in market demand
would create a competitive advantage for actors who adopt a weak commitment strategy
and infrequent shifts would give the edge to actors who adopt a strong commitment strategy
(Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008). Overall, we expect for adopting a moderate commitment
strategy to be valuable in markets where the following three scope conditions are veriﬁed:
(i) network connections are conduits for information diﬀusion and provide actors with an
opportunity to combine complementary assets; (ii) actors must learn or discover what diﬀer-
ent partnerships are worth with experience; and (iii) there are shifts in market demand that
change the value of network partnerships and those shifts cannot be (easily) anticipated.
While these scope conditions seem narrow, they also seem relevant for empirical contexts
beyond inter-ﬁrm relationships such as strategic alliances. For example, similar dynamics
take place inside organizations too, namely in contexts where knowledge experts who work
in a multiple team context combine their “know how” to promote creativity and innovation.
We also believe our ﬁndings have important implications for scholars with an interest
21
in network dynamics deﬁned more broadly than commitment. For example, a number of
researchers have noted the dilemma actors face when they must either select a network
characterized by redundancy or by non-redundancy. An actor who maintains a network
characterized by redundancy maintains relationships with contacts who are also connected to
each other. The non-redundancy versus redundancy debate parallels the weak versus strong
commitment discussion. Each network position is characterized by a distinct set of risks and
rewards (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008). Indeed, scholars often equate a weak commitment
strategy (i.e., the presence of weak ties) with non-redundancy and a strong commitment
strategy (i.e. the presence of strong ties) with redundancy (Hansen, 1999). It seems natural
to conclude that the beneﬁts associated with non-redundancy will be maximized when actors
adopt a weak commitment strategy and the beneﬁts associated with redundancy will be
maximized when actors adopt a strong commitment strategy. Our results call this conclusion
into question. In particular, our task (i.e., combining complementary assets) created a
competitive advantage for actors who were able to develop a network position characterized
by non-redundancy because actors who were able to develop and sustain such a position
could accumulate more information about a wider array of partnerships. However, simulation
results (not shown) also indicated that actors who adopted a moderate commitment strategy
beneﬁted from non-redundancy more than actors who adopted a weak commitment strategy.
Actors who adopted a weak commitment strategy were more likely to experience coordination
failures and as a result, were unable to sustain a network position characterized by non-
redundancy over time. If our task created an advantage for actors in a network position
characterized by redundancy, actors who adopted a moderate commitment strategy would
do better than actors who adopted a strong commitment strategy. And this is so because
independent of the task actors must ﬁrst ﬁgure out which partnerships are worthwhile and
they have to avoid coordination failures while they ﬁgure out what to do.
Finally, our ﬁndings illustrate the dynamic link between micro-motives and more macro-
level outcomes. For example, social capital researchers often assume that goal-oriented
actors seek out diﬀerent network positions for the beneﬁts those positions provide. More
recent research has shown, however, that network-based beneﬁts cannot be sustained when
all actors share the primary objective of achieving those beneﬁts and these objectives are
common knowledge (Ryall and Sorenson, 2007; Buskens and van de Rijt, 2008). Our ﬁndings
reinforce this lesson for a diﬀerent but related reason. Actors who adopt a weak commitment
strategy are the most goal-oriented agents in our model, in the sense that they attempt to
maximize the value of their knowledge and information. However, when our network society
only contained weak commitment agents, system-wide performance suﬀered. Actors who
adopt a weak commitment strategy are unable to recover from minor disagreements about
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the value of a partnership and thus are more likely to experience coordination failures. Thus,
network positions and the beneﬁts those positions provide cannot be sustained when all our
agents adopt a weak commitment strategy (i.e., are goal-oriented). Moreover, even in a mixed
society, actors who adopted a weak commitment strategy end up doing worse than actors
who adopted a moderate commitment strategy. Actors with a weak commitment strategy
attempt to maximize the value of what they know but what they know is often incomplete
and even when it is not incomplete, they often suﬀer from a ﬁrst mover disadvantage. Actors
who adopt a weak commitment strategy try to consummate relationships with contacts who
do not realize the value of their partnership.
The actors who do the best in our society are actors who are patient and maintain a
network connection even when they believe a more rewarding alliance is available. Patience
provides them with an opportunity to learn. But actors who adopt a moderate commit-
ment strategy only do better because they are eventually willing to act on what they have
learned. And since network connections are conduits for information diﬀusion, what mod-
erate commitment actors have learned to do spills over to their contacts, thereby improving
system-wide performance. Thus, in addition to advancing our understanding of how com-
mitment aﬀects local network dynamics, our framework illustrates how a micro behavior like
commitment can shape more macro and system-level outcomes.
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Figure 1: Performance Decomposition. Depicts average overall performance, average performance per
alliance, coordination failure, and knowledge and information, as a function of the number of rounds since
the last change in demand. All results are averaged across the “time since change” variable (note that this is
fully exogenous in our model) and use the same data as in table 2. Note: average performance per alliance
excludes rounds where no link materializes; coordination failure is the proportion of rounds where no link
materializes; knowledge and information measures how close an actor’s beliefs are with respect to hidden
mean payoﬀs.
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Figure 2: Performance over Time – WC Society. Shows the average performance of agents in a
weak-commitment society (all agents have 훾 = 1). Results obtained by simulating network evolution for
50,000 rounds; each time period in the graph corresponds to averages of adjacent sub-periods with length
1,000.
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Table 1: Description of Parameters and Variables. The order of presentation in the table is the same
as the order in which parameters and variables appear in the document.
Parameter /
Variable
Description
푁 Number of social actors.
푀 Number of distinct competence cohorts.
푄푖,푡 Total realized performance of actor 푖 at time 푡 (i.e. summing across all al-
liances).
퐵푖푗,푡 Realized performance of a successful alliance between actors 푖 and 푗 at time 푡;
is a function of an underlying persistent component in market demand that is
unobservable (see 퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗)푡 below) and white noise (see 휖푖푗,푡 below).
퐿푖푗,푡 Indicator variable, taking value 1 if actors 푖 and 푗 successfully develop an al-
liance at time 푡. The probability that 퐿푖푗,푡 is 1 is a function of the attention
(see 푎푖푗,푡 below) that the partners devote to the alliance.
푎푖푗,푡 Attention (i.e. amount of time) devoted by actor 푖 to the relationship with
actor 푗.
훾푖 Measures the likelihood that actor 푖 will revise her partnership decisions, at any
period (committed actors have lower 훾).
퐵ˆ푖푗,푡 Actor 푖’s subjective belief at time 푡 regarding the payoﬀ of a successful alliance
with actor 푗.
퐵¯푚(푖)푚(푗),푡 Unobservable persistent component of market demand, with respect to an al-
liance between a pair of actors belonging to competence cohorts 푚(푖) and 푚(푗);
may take on two values only (high in “good times” and low in “bad times”).
휎퐵 Governs the volatility in unobserved market demand (i.e. distance between
demand level in good times versus bad times).
휙 Likelihood that unobserved market demand shifts from good to bad times and
vice-versa.
휖푖푗,푡 White noise shocks aﬀecting the realized performance of an alliance between 푖
and 푗 at time 푡.
휎휖 Measures volatility in white noise.
퐷푖푗,푡 Network distance between actors 푖 and 푗 at time 푡.
훼 Governs rate at which information diﬀuses across network connections.
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Table 2: Long-Run Performance in Mixed Societies. Shows summary statistics for societies composed
of three commitment types: weak commitment (WC), moderate commitment (MC), and strong commitment
(SC) actors.
WC MC SC
Average overall performance 0.94 1.23 1.10
Average performance per alliance 1.49 1.45 1.30
Coordination failure 40% 22% 27%
Average level of knowledge and information 238 301 275
Note: coordination failure stands for the proportion of rounds where no link materialized; average
performance per alliance excludes rounds where no link materialized; knowledge/information is
measured by how close an actor’s beliefs are to true hidden mean payoﬀs. The network was
simulated for 50,000 periods.
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Table 3: Performance Decomposition – Regressions. Shows regression coeﬃcients and robust stan-
dard errors (in parenthesis). The dependent variables are average overall performance, average performance
per alliance, level of coordination failure, and amount of knowledge and information. The independent vari-
ables are weak commitment (푊퐶), strong commitment (푆퐶), time since demand change (푇퐼푀퐸), and a
constant (퐶푂푁푆푇 ). The interactions are 푊퐶 × 푇퐼푀퐸 and 푆퐶 × 푇퐼푀퐸.
Average Overall Average Performance Coordination Knowledge and
Performance per Alliance Failure Information
퐶푂푁푆푇 1.166 1.349 0.235 286
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (1.06)
푊퐶 −0.290 0.035 0.181 −63.7
(0.020) (0.007) (0.012) (4.66)
푆퐶 −0.123 −0.157 0.041 −23.5
(0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (1.84)
푇퐼푀퐸 0.022 0.018 −0.003 5.30
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.20)
푊퐶×푇퐼푀퐸 −0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.36
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.31)
푆퐶 × 푇퐼푀퐸 −0.005 −0.003 0.001 −1.21
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.30)
푅2 0.86 0.90 0.84 0.88
Obs. 756 756 756 756
Note: average performance per alliance is conditional on at least one link having materialized; coordination failure is
the proportion of rounds where an actor did not materialize at least one link; knowledge and information measures
how close an actor’s beliefs are to true hidden combination payoﬀs; 푇퐼푀퐸 counts the number of rounds since the
last change in hidden combination payoﬀs. Results obtained by simulating network evolution for 50,000 rounds
(same data as in table 2) and averaging across 푇퐼푀퐸 (note that this is a fully exogenous variable in our model).
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Table 4: Changing 훼 in Mixed Societies. Shows average overall performance, coordination failure, and
knowledge and information for a mixed society with three commitment levels: weak commitment (WC),
moderate commitment (MC), and strong commitment (SC).
훼 = 0 훼 = 1 훼 = 999, 999
WC MC SC WC MC SC WC MC SC
Average overall
performance
1.04 1.18 1.11 0.94 1.23 1.10 1.10 1.23 1.11
Coordination
failure
34% 21% 22% 40% 22% 27% 30% 21% 26%
Knowledge and
information
830 830 830 238 301 275 269 296 271
Note: coordination failure stands for the proportion of rounds where no link materialized; knowledge/information
is measured by how close an actor’s beliefs are to true hidden mean payoﬀs. The network was simulated for
50,000 periods. All magnitudes besides 훼 are set at the benchmark level.
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Table 5: Changing 훼 in WC Societies. Shows average overall performance, coordination failure, and
knowledge and information in a society composed of WC actors.
훼 = 0 훼 = 1
Average overall performance 1.34 0.07
Coordination failure 38% 96%
Knowledge and information 374 27
Note: coordination failure stands for the proportion of rounds where no link
materialized; knowledge and information is measured by how close an actor’s
beliefs are to true hidden mean payoﬀs. The network was simulated for 50,000
periods. All magnitudes besides 훼 are set at the benchmark level.
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